University of Wollongong

Research Online
Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive)

Faculty of Business and Law

2012

The changing pattern of state workers' labour resistance in Shaanxi
Province, China
Zhiming Cheng
University of Wollongong, zhiming@uow.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers
Part of the Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Cheng, Zhiming, "The changing pattern of state workers' labour resistance in Shaanxi Province, China"
(2012). Faculty of Business - Papers (Archive). 106.
https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/106

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The changing pattern of state workers' labour resistance in Shaanxi Province,
China
Abstract
State workers in China have been suffering multiple negative shocks due to state sector reforms and
massive lay-offs since the 1990s. One of their responses has been to engage in conventional forms of
rightful resistance to assert their rights and benefits. The recent development of such labour resistance,
however, has been less studied. This paper examines the recent collective rights action among state
workers in Shaanxi province to examine the evolving pattern of resistance that changed from relatively
non-threatening to radical, and from offline to a mixture of real-life and cyberspace actions. Because the
recent movements directly challenged the authoritarian power of the agencies of the ruling party, local
authorities have not tolerated the rights action as they had previously, but have suppressed resistance.
The findings add to the body of knowledge regarding the changing relationship between the state and
workers, and the interplay between traditional resistance politics and emerging cyberspace activism in
transitional China.

Keywords
province, shaanxi, resistance, labour, workers, state, pattern, china, changing

Disciplines
Business

Publication Details
Cheng, Z. (2012). The changing pattern of state workers' labour resistance in Shaanxi Province, China.
Communication, Politics and Culture, 45 (2), 197-216.

This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/buspapers/106

The Changing Pattern of State Workers’ Labour Resistance in Shaanxi Province, China

Abstract
State workers in China have been suffering multiple negative shocks due to state sector reforms and
massive layoffs since the 1990s. One of their responses has been to engage in conventional forms of
rightful resistance to assert their rights and benefits. The recent development of such labour
resistance, however, has been less studied. This paper examines the recent collective rights action
among state workers in Shaanxi province to examine the evolving pattern of resistance that changed
from relatively nonthreatening to a radical form, and from offline to a mixture of real-life and
cyberspace actions. Because the recent movements directly challenged the authoritarian power of the
agencies of ruling party, local authorities have not tolerated the rights action as they had previously,
but suppressed resistance. The findings add to the body of knowledge regarding the changing
relationship between the state and workers, and the interplay between traditional resistance politics
and emerging cyberspace activism in transitional China.
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Introduction
Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese Government has restructured the ownership of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) — the once predominant danwei (socialist work units) of urban economy — and
reduced their staff. By 2005, nearly 30 million, or 60 per cent, of SOE workers had been dismissed
(Liu, 2005), and the state sector’s share of urban employment decreased from 82 per cent in 1978 to
27 per cent in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006). As a result, most state workers’
relationships with danwei ceased after they were compensated with a one-off severance payment,
which was usually perceived as being disproportionate to their contribution. Disenfranchised and in
dire straits, state workers also perceived themselves as being enduring a great injustice and rights
violation (Cai, 2006). Claims for rights and justice through petitions, protests and demonstrations
between the mid-1990s to the early-2000s were very often seen in SOE compounds and streets,
sparking massive labour insurgencies (Mok et al., 2002). Since the mid-2000s, little official statistics
and information about layoffs have been published, giving the public an impression that the national
layoff program was completed.
On to the contrary, de facto layoffs never ended; rather, after shedding a massive number of workers,
SOEs embarked on an even more aggressive wave of restructuring. In turn, these moves resulted in
numerous new resistance activities, which have been scantily studied. One research report looks into
the many emerging disputes by state workers who had recently been, or were about to be, laid off and
asserts that local governments have learnt nothing from the debacle of the late 1990s (China Labour
Bulletin, 2009b). The ongoing SOE reform and labour retrenchment have induced a series of ongoing,
heated resistances with new characteristics.
This study focuses on workers in the SOE reform in Shaanxi province of north-western China. The
province was representative of the inner-China development model that relies on the state’s
investment (Walcott, 2004), and has been stricken by urban poverty induced by layoffs since the late1990s (Cheng and Beresford, 2012). The reason for studying Shaanxi is that its state sector had been
the backbone of its provincial economy throughout the pre-reform and early post-reform eras, and its
SOE reform is still in progress. This paper researches one of the most extraordinary and influential
cases of resistance carried out by state workers in recent years. It provides a detailed and updated
account of the significant but less revealed movement within the research framework of rightful
resistance—one of the major types of contention expression in post-reform China.1
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O’Brien (1996) (p. 31) defines rightful resistance as: ‘…a partly institutionalized form of popular action that employs laws, policies, and
other established values to defy power holders who have failed to live up to some ideal or who have not implemented a popular
measure…Aggrieved individuals and groups turn to established principles to anchor their defiance; use legitimating myths and
normative language to frame their claims; rely on existing statutes and government commitments when leveling their charges; and
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Since the case was almost unreported by traditional media, collection and critical analysis of both
original and secondary data are crucial and necessary. Between September 2010 and June 2011, data
collection was conducted through three major approaches. First, fifteen state workers and their
supporters (including three leading organizers) participated in the resistance, three managers in SOEs
in which the workers participated in the resistance, three trade union officials, and six government
officials were interviewed by using semi- or un-structured interview techniques in order to
reconstruct the timeline and key events of the movement from the perspectives of different parties.
Second, released government and court documents, and other materials publicly published by the
lawyers who defended a major activist, were collected and analysed as secondary data in order to
examine the local state’s responses to the movement and activists, and vice versa. Third, materials
from the online media such as blog texts, articles, petitions and reports and online communication
and conversation records between participants via instant messaging program were collected to
examine the spread of influence during the course of action and how activists interacted and
cooperated with each other in cyberspace and affected real-life resistant activities. Most existing
reports in relation to this case are fragmented, demonstrated bias, or were not rigorous in research
terms.
The next section explains that hardship, poverty and labour disputes are still current issues facing the
cohort of (former) state workers. It is followed by two sections describing how the patterns of
resistance carried out by state workers in Shaanxi, and the local state’s responses, have changed over
time with one section providing deeper analysis on the interplay between the local state and the state
workers and their supporters during the changes. The final section provides the discussion and
conclusion.

Research background
Once-secure state workers have found it hard to endure rapid increases in educational, medical,
housing and living costs, and combined with reduced incomes and limited savings accumulated
before the layoff, many have fallen into hardship and poverty (Fang et al., 2002). Yao (2004)
locate and mobilize advocates within officialdom. In differing contexts, a combination of rights talk, legal tactics, and open
confrontation may induce power holders to surrender advantages in accord with principles that usually favor them.’ Rightful resistance
has been widely adopted as a major tool against the state and capital by peasants, disadvantaged state workers and other groups
(O'Brien and Li, 2006). The movement employs a mix of characteristics, from institutional participation, social movements, rights
consciousness-raising and everyday forms of resistance (Scott, 1987). It is essentially ‘a fight to compel the authorities to narrow the gap
between what they say and what they do in a context where rights that are recognised — more or less formally — but are not guaranteed’
(Froissart, 2007) (p.117).
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estimated that about one-fifth of the urban poverty has been caused by the state sector layoffs. State
workers’ social and human capital disadvantages due to deficiencies in education and utilisable social
connections have deterred workers from seeking re-employment and dampened their career progress
in an emerging market-oriented labour system (Knight and Song, 2005). Only approximately 30 per
cent of laid-off workers have been able to get jobs through the re-employment service (China Labour
Bulletin, 2009d).
State workers’ movements related to layoff procedures, hardship and poverty constitute a substantial
proportion of labour disputes, which rose 55 times between 1993 and 2009 in volume, involving more
than one million employees a year (Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2009). Many of these
disputes have triggered strikes, demonstrations, rights suits and even violence and riots, or the socalled mass incidents (quntixing shijian) (Weil, 2006).
Rapidly expanded labour disputes and collective action among state workers were fostered within the
organisational structure of socialist workplace. In the pre-reform era, the danwei system was in place
to maximise the utilisation of labour by controlling the daily production of labour power and mobility.
The theory of neo-traditionalism suggests that danwei managed their workers through organised
dependence and principled particularism (Walder, 1986). The former dictated that state workers had
to rely solely on danwei’s overall control and provision of living resources and career opportunities in
a systematic, structural manner; while the latter implies a reward system to state workers who were
committed and loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and management. These two approaches
created a patron–client relationship between SOE cadres — the representative of the party–state
regime — and ordinary workers, deterring collective action and organised political activities. In the
pre-reform political economy that excluded market mechanisms, individuals were assigned to danwei
without choice, and separated geographically in cities in confined compounds that usually served both
production and residential functions.
However, in the post-reform era, the danwei system actually has the potential to spark large-scale
collective action (Zhou, 1993). Individuals are gathered in unified, highly concentrated groups by
working and living in same compound and community, providing the proximity and convenience for
collective action to be formed and carried out. In other words, the organisational structure of danwei
has given state workers a convenient structure in which to organise collective action and protest in the
form of rightful resistance.
While SOE layoffs were devalued as an anachronistic term by the state, they nevertheless continue
surreptitiously in many cities, but under different names, such as optimisation of human resources
and reducing overstaffing. Much of the research on state workers that was published in the early
4

2000s was based on data collected in or before that period. However, a series of significant rightful
resistance amongst state workers occurred between 2008 and 2010. For example, in 2008 Xi’an, the
capital of Shaanxi province (the focus of this paper) had the largest SOE bankruptcy in the province’s
history, retrenching more than 9,000 workers from a restructured state-owned textile industrial
complex (Cheng, 2011).

Silenced traditional media and institutionalised benign resistance
Since the author’s initial observations in Xi’an in 2001, numerous rights groups have gathered and
sometimes purposely blocked the traffic in front of government buildings and the headquarters of
traditional media such as newspapers and television satiations to protest and express their grievances
in the hope of attracting official and media attention. 2 The local state realised that such
demonstrations were an opportunity for state workers to release their pent-up anger, and that strong
measures could attract a negative public reaction. Thus, it usually endured such activities and
publicity campaigns, provided protestors did not assault police officials who maintained order.
The local state, however, could not be regarded as merely passive. We found that, until the late-2000s,
the local state’s superior and authoritarian status over traditional media and state workers had
allowed it to curb resistance and direct it to a preferred path. On the one hand, under strict media
censorship especially after early-2000s, traditional media was not allowed to report workers’
resistance, even after workers’ allegations were found justifiable by journalists.3 Ironically, interviews
conducted revealed that small pieces of news — usually containing only a few sentences — in relation
to aggressive labour protestors who were found guilty were published at the request of the authorities.
Eventually traditional media lost interest in investigating workers’ allegations because they were
mostly unpublishable. According to an interviewed government official who coordinated local
newspapers and the provincial propaganda department, the purpose of strict media regulation in this
regard was to annihilate the adverse influence of resistance and conjure up a public image that labour
resistance was politically risky and discouraging, ‘leaving no media space for labour activism’.
On the other hand, without the help of traditional media, workers were usually left with one
institutional option: they had to rely solely on the local government to solve their issues, even if there
was an inherent distrust of officials. Reconciliation was then cautiously achieved between workers and
involved parties (for example, the trade union, court, procurator or SOE management) through
2

In the 1990s, investigating journalism flourished in China. Therefore looking for help from journalists in traditional media has been
deemed by protestors as an important approach to raise official attention.
3
Based on an interview of a local newspaper journalist conducted on December 12, 2010.
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cooperation on, or behind, the scenes of resistance. More importantly, a state of mutual
understanding between the local state and state workers stabilised: workers would not be too
aggressive in challenging the local government’s principles and limits; while the local government
promised — and sometimes did make some progress — to address their claims through financial
compensation to workers and legal supervision on SOE restructuring. These measures essentially deradicalised workers and transferred their discontent to governments’ preferred institutionalised
channels, such as official mediation and arbitration, and the judiciary.
The path dependence effect manipulated by the local state through its media censorship and
institutional arrangements, among other forces, compelled state workers to enter into a mutual
agreement with the local state. State workers were cautious about their behaviour because all protests
were unregistered, and hence illegal. By reading from the news pieces regarding criminated protestors,
workers also understood that the government would not tolerate radical approaches, and so they
mostly followed a pattern of nonviolent and sometimes silent and disciplined protests in public. As a
comforting measure, officials of responsible departments often pacified protesters with promises of
assistance and investigations into alleged injustice, corruption and so on, according to some workers
who participated in resistance.
Although on occasion some heated conflicts occurred between state workers, the authorities and
(post-reform) SOE management, Shaanxi was able to maintain a relatively less tumultuous
relationship between the local government and state workers, compared to the situation in some of
the north-eastern provinces. This accords with other observations that the Chinese regime has shown
a considerable degree of tolerance toward protests by workers if they remained clearly contained in
both scale and aspirations (Tong and Lei, 2010), and it has been willing to accommodate some of their
requests (Su and He, 2010).

New communication technologies and coordinated radical resistance
As discussed above, for some years, state workers’ protests in Shaanxi had been spasmodic,
spontaneous and mostly uncoordinated, as seen elsewhere in China (Blecher, 2002), and they were
usually confined to single firms (Gold et al., 2009). In the late-2000s Shaanxi’s state workers in the
context of widening socio-economic inequalities expressed a new round of grievance and discontent.
The understanding and reconciliation between the local state and state workers, fragile as they might
be, began to erode after a series of unforeseen real-life and cyberspace events to be presented and
analysed below.

6

The new resistance featured four major fresh characteristics. First, it promoted a different target of
resistance. Second, it was more radical, organized and coordinated than previous practices in terms of
organization and operation. Third, online communication tools and media played an important role
in organizing the resistance, dodging the authorities and censorship, and interacting with wider
community. Last but not least, real-life and cyberspace actions were implemented simultaneously
during the course of resistance to make the most out of each approach in achieving goals.
As the first step, in August 2008 the Shaanxi Study Group of Mao Zedong Thought (hereafter ‘the
Study Group’) was established among workers — mostly at or above their 40s — of several SOEs in
Xi’an. While most similar study groups and activities in other provinces mainly mourned the
vanishing socialist ideals in the context of nostalgia for the Mao era, the Study Group had greater
ambitions than ‘shallow monetary goals’ sought under the guise of promoting Maoism, and this was
beyond the expectation of local government which believed that workers had to rely on the
aforementioned institutionalized channels to give voice, according to an official from the provincial
government. The process of later resistance ignited by the Study Group was divided into two phases,
defining by before and after one of the leading organizers, Zhao Dongmin, who was a committed
Maoist and labour advocate, was taken into custody by the local enforcement department (see Figure
1).
<Figure 1 here>
Between October and November 2008 the Study Group established the Shaanxi Trade Union Rights
Defence Representative Congress (hereafter ‘the Rights Congress’). The Rights Congress promoted a
more organised form of labour movement across SOEs and cities in Shaanxi, and explicitly asked
workers not to protest in government agencies, but instead to express their concerns and requests in a
(self-perceived) legal, collective and organised manner, such as through the official trade union.
Meanwhile, the Rights Congress carefully bounded the proposal by closely and unconditionally
following the ideological principles of CCP.4
Online communication technologies were widely used by the organizers and participants. At the
beginning, small, secretive discussion groups registered through instant messaging programs were
used to propagate information and to circumvent the nodes of traditional social control systems (such
as neighbourhood committee) that government deployed in SOEs in order to monitor and silence
dissent. As revealed in interviews, the Rights Congress did raise the concerns of public security
officials, but they believed that it did not warrant deeper investigation since the affiliated Study Group
4

These principals, briefly speaking, are ‘resolutely upholding the leadership of the CCP’, ‘protecting the principles of the Constitution’,
and ‘uniting the working class’.
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was quite an ordinary, unthreatening assembly of state workers. This oversight on the government’s
part made way for the expansion of one of the most extraordinary and influential state workers’
resistant actions in Shaanxi’s history.
Since the authorities did not react to the workers’ online activities, resistance had more openly gone
out live on the Internet in order to ‘understand vox populi and inform comrades and supporters.’
Dispersion methods included a number of online communication tools and media including mailing
list, online forums, blogs, and instant messaging programs. According to participants, these were
considered to be safer than ‘face-to-face communication’ and ‘making phone calls’ that could be more
easily monitored by the authorities. The go-online strategy was ‘effective, economical and safe’ —
according to an interviewed organizer – in the sense that the Rights Congress’ proposal to establish a
representative organisation and online promotion attracted an increasing number of workers, who
had previously failed to draw attention from traditional media and lacked recourse to institutional
politics.
After the preparation stage, the Rights Congress turned more attention to organizing real-life
activities. On 7 April 2009 Zhao assisted a group of nearly 400 workers from about twenty SOEs to
apply to the Provincial CCP Committee and the provincial branch of the All-China Federation of Trade
Union (ACFTU, the only legal trade union under the leadership of the CCP; hereafter ‘the Provincial
Trade Union’) to register the Rights Congress as an enterprise restructuring watchdog. They were
concerned that the official trade union was failing, and that workers’ congresses — the legal peak
bodies in SOEs — had been bypassed in the reform process. Officials immediately dismissed the
application and refused workers’ request of a formal meeting.
The rebuff was seen to validate the setting up by workers of their own representative congress,
according to one of the Rights Congress’ reports published online later to appeal to workers for
support. Although making no progress in legalizing the Rights Congress, it became better known
among workers in Xi’an and other cities through online dissemination of information conducted by a
group of volunteers who closely followed the progress of resistance, or participated in it. This also
drew overseas journalists’ attention and a number of interviews of participating workers and related
videos were published and broadcasted through news websites and online radios such as Radio Free
Asia based in the United States. 5
On 15 June 2009 the Rights Congress requested the dismissal of the Provincial Trade Union’s
president through a visit to it in order to submit an open letter.6 This request, being viewed as an
5
6

For example, see http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/zhao-10202010150936.html.
A video recording the whole process can be found on YouTube (see h http://youtu.be/L5-edu7L1l0).
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unacceptable challenge, irritated the officials of Provincial Trade Union and prompted them to ask
from the local authorities for the suppression of the Rights Congress, according to an interview. The
authorities made use of a sophisticated operation of government agencies to outlaw the Rights
Congress. On 10 July 2009, in a confidential report (leaked and then obtained by Zhao’s lawyers
subsequently), the Provincial Trade Union officially asked the police for a raid on the Rights Congress,
particularly targeting Zhao (Li, 2010b).
The workers believed that they had protested against the Provincial Trade Union using moderation,
but the report described them, their leaders and their resistant activities as a major threat to the
Party-state.7 Authorities, however, defended their actions as rational and necessary by referring to a
labour conflict that had erupted in a SOE in Jilin province on 24 July 2009.8 Against this background,
the fear of mass incidents was fermenting inside the Provincial Trade Union, affected SOEs and
government agencies.
More steps were taken to crack down on the both online and offline activities of the Rights Congress.
On 27 July 2009, the Provincial Bureau of Civil Affairs, the superior administration of civic
organisations, stepped in and outlawed the unauthorised Rights Congress. At the same time, online
petitions and discussion groups were also deleted by the Internet police, according to participants.
However, the Rights Congress ignored the ruling. Its key members accepted online leftist media
interviews to call for public support beyond Shaanxi. This irritated the authorities, who had intended
to confine the Rights Congress’ influence to Shaanxi, and had hoped to put an end to the nuisance
quickly, according to a local government official took part in the implementation of cracking-down.
As the final step and attempt before Zhao’s detention, showing further noncompliance to local
government’s directions, he wrote petition to the Central Government and the CCP committees at the
municipal, provincial and central levels. Posted online through leftist blogs, online discussion boards
and Maoist websites, the petition made the issues and propositions much more widely known within
and outside Shaanxi. Appealing to higher, more central, and presumably more righteous and powerful
authorities constituted the major approach adopted by agitated state workers in Shaanxi and
7

A section of the report reads: Since April this year (2009), key members of the Rights Congress have changed their focus from inciting
people online to taking real action in the society. They stepped up from brewing a plot from behind the curtain to the front stage of
confrontation, with more frequent unrest, deeper harm, and the possibility to make the Rights Congress bigger and stronger… Zhao
Dongmin and other key members expressed the intention to organise a larger ‘legal gathering’ at a critical point, showing an obvious
political intrigue… They utilised some social problems and older and poor health retired workers as the leverage to press on the
government, showing a strong ability of agitation and captivation, and an insufferable arrogance. If immediate action is not taken and
they are indulged, it is highly possible that mass incidents will occur.’
8
After a private company had taken control of Tonghua Iron and Steel Group (Tonggang) as the major shareholder, a new general
manager was appointed by the private company to replace the formerly government-assigned manager and prepare for a proposed full
takeover. Meanwhile, rumours were circulating among workers that large-scale layoffs would occur. Nearly ten thousand workers who
were disgruntled about the privatisation and worried about their jobs rioted, and beat the newly appointed general manager to death
(Ouyang et al., 2010).
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elsewhere in rightful resistance. Their behaviour, however, finally provoked the local authorities, who
had once hoped that the workers would retreat after the Rights Congress was made illegal in real life,
and further suppression attempts were made against key resistance members.
On 19 August 2009 Zhao was detained and isolated from his family and the public until late 2010. He
was in custody for more than thirteen months, far in excess of the legal limit, during which time his
wife died. On 25 October 2010, in his first trial, Zhao was sentenced to three years in prison for the
crime of ‘gathering a crowd to disrupt social order’.9 After the second trial, on 27 January 2011, Zhao
was finally released from jail with a suspended sentence of three years.
During this period, online supporters appealed for donations and asked for support for Zhao’s family
in poverty. One of the supporters we interviewed, however, was subpoenaed by the public security
office and asked not to post any more online support. It was obvious that, the local authorities had
realised, after the outbreak of the Rights Congress, the importance of controlling online information
dissemination with respect to Zhao’s case. But this control was deemed ineffective, as to be discussed
in the next section. In fact, the case demonstrated an evolving pattern of labour resistance in the
context of emerging communication technologies and new media characterized by strong cyberspace
support. The next section will discuss this in details.

Emerging online activism and an evolving pattern of resistance
Recent research shows that 1980s resistance favoured direct and confrontational approaches while
that in the later 1990s it relied increasingly on indirect and legal means (Pei, 2010). This study
confirms that state workers and their supporters have indeed applied a mixed strategy in redeveloping
and refining their tactics, and further argues that this strategy has successfully reshaped their power
relations with the local state (see Figure 1). On one hand, the approaches of the Study Group and the
Rights Congress shared characteristics with earlier state workers’ resistance, in that they followed a
conventional pattern of combining naming, framing and blaming (Hung and Chiu, 2009).10 On the
other hand, comparing to earlier resistant movements, several new characteristics, including the
utilisation of online media, reshaped the pattern of resistance in the context of emerging online
activism.
9

Court documents accused Zhao of organising workers to rally at the Provincial Trade Union‘s offices, ‘severely disrupting the Union’s
business operation for seven hours’ where the workers were ‘making noises, shouting slogans and humiliating staff members’ (Li,
2010a).
10
Workers named the problematic SOE reforms as the main cause of their miseries; framed their requests by referencing the theories of
Marxism and Maoism that the Chinese socialist regime had been built on, and blamed the weak trade union for not safeguarding
workers’ benefits, displaying elements of moral economic resistance (Hurst and O'Brien, 2002). They especially referenced Maoism in
discussing China’s transition towards capitalism, and how Mao’s foresight had been proven and his concerns validated in transitional
China (Wei, 2011).
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First, the timing and organizing of resistance was more proactive. In the past, radicalism had occurred
upon exit from the working class (for example, layoff and forced retirement), when workers no longer
had the power to stop production (Lee, 2002). But the Rights Congress took the initiative to prevent
potential or further infringement on the benefits accrued by workers and the threat to state assets.
This was in line with a growing trend for workers to take action against the corrupt conditions under
which their enterprises were reformed and privatised (Gilbert, 2005). The proactive approach has
made the local authorities, whose caution was mainly on putting a curb on post-retrenchment
resistance, neglect its early development.
Second, the requests in the resistance were more radical — and damaging to the established state-led
conciliation. Previously, workers’ bargaining approaches to SOE management mainly campaigned for
economic gains, respect and autonomy at the shop floor level (Zhang, 2008). However, the Rights
Congress not only opposed SOE reform, but also asked for supervisory power over management and
the enterprise branches of the trade union. In addition, they directly challenged the leadership of the
Provincial Trade Union through real-life and cyberspace actions. This not only broke the once
peaceful, benign and somewhat cooperative relationship between the trade union and workers, it also
irrevocably altered worker–danwei and worker–state relationships, by transforming them from
dependency to defiance (Morris et al., 2001). This has later resulted in a mismatch between the
perceptions of the workers and the local state in terms of the tolerance boundary, spurring repression
by local state upon the activists.
Third, the resistance was less tolerated by the local state after the breakdown of conciliation. ACFTU
and its multi-level branches have been wary of, and often felt threatened by, workers’ attempts to
establish their own representative organisations (China Labour Bulletin, 2009c). 11 The Rights
Congress was dangerous in the eyes of local authorities and the trade union because it linked different
cities and organised workers from several SOEs. After the crackdown on Falun Gong in the late 1990s,
China has heavily repressed revolts and potentially radical popular movements. Therefore, many civic
movements tried to shield themselves by labelling their purpose as ‘not against the state’ (Zhu and Ho,
2011). Although workers had argued that they had no intention to contest the authorities, the
activities of the Rights Congress had, from the trade union’s perspective, challenged the legal and
superior status of the union that was backed by the CCP.

11

For instance, in February 2009, right at the height of the global financial crisis, the ACFTU reminded its branches to ‘keep a close
lookout for foreign and domestic hostile forces using the difficulties encountered by some companies to infiltrate and undermine the
ranks of migrant workers’. These words were echoed by Shaanxi’s officials, who claimed that the Rights Congress was in collusion with
foreign forces, and was a reactionary organisation that could harm China’s achieving of a harmonious society (China Labour Bulletin,
2009a).
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Fourth, the resistance was operated in a relatively organized form to muster different sub-groups.
With different rights claims and statuses, the varied contentions of the groups of current, laid-off and
retired workers in SOEs meant that they did not always pool their resistant efforts. The Rights
Congress differed from these rights groups because it provided a platform that was inclusive of
different groups from multiple SOEs who shared ‘a bitter hatred for corrupt management, the trade
union and the SOE reform program’, according to interviewed participants. This produced a stronger
collective voice than ever before. The organisational form, however, created new challenges to the
governance power for the local authorities. Their capacity for governing labour matters and unrest
had been mainly built on the experiences of dealing with workers with conventional claims, which
could often be solved within established governance frameworks and within single firms or groups.
Finally, and the most distinctively, the resistance was a combination of conventional and cyberspace
activities. Interviewed officials admitted that Zhao and his colleagues’ ability to organise and mobilise
workers across SOEs and cities was the reason that the authorities kept him in detention for such a
long period in an attempt to quash his influence. However, his case attracted even wider attention on
Internet and more support from Maoists and other leftists in general both within and outside China.12
The online movements in this phrase, to be discussed below, had gone through several steps to reach
the peak of national attention, illustrating the contentious characters of the Chinese Internet.
Initially, in order to raise wider attention, Zhao’s close supporters in Shaanxi posted articles online,
portraying his life experience and praising him as a self-giving activist and brave challenger to
corrupted officials. 13 The dissemination of these pieces, which were certainly banned by the
traditional media, rapidly attracted attention beyond the province through the means of mailing list,
forums, blogs, Twitter-like microblogs and instant messaging programs. 14 It was beyond the
provincial Internet police’s capacity to control for the proliferating online resistant information
outside Shaanxi. Yang (2009) too suggests that the state's efforts at censorship are fairly ineffective,
stating that ‘state power constrains the forms and issues of contention, but instead of preventing it
from happening, it forces activists to be more creative and artful’ (p. 7). For the very first time, the
power relationship between workers and the local state, as manifested in the outcomes of their
struggles in the cyberspace, had slightly shifted in favour of the former.

12

For example, the famous New York-based Monthly Review magazine republished an article about Zhao. See
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/clnt130111.html.
13
Supporters compiled a volume of articles about Zhao with 1,101 pages. See http://dajialai.org/ziliao1/.
14
In Wuyouzhixiang (literally ‘Utopia’; shut down in 2012), arguably the most influential leftist online forum, nearly 4,000 articles and
opinion pieces were posted in a short time, and they were reposted daily by other forums such as Maopai gongren (literally ‘Maoist
workers’) that devoted specifically to state workers. A number of Zhao Dongmin Concern Groups (guanzhu tuan) were also established
online in most provinces, posting articles in local websites and asking for the immediate release of Zhao.
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More online and offline activity further pushed the resistance in favour of Zhao. First, people in China
and other parts of the world signed petitions arguing for the release of Zhao.15 Second, since October
2010, Li Jinsong, a Beijing trial lawyer famous for defending for the disadvantaged and rights activists
(Kahn, 2007), has written a number of widely circulated public reports from the legal perspective and
continually updated his client’s progress online.16 Li’s participation significantly enriched the means
of second-phase resistance which was initially morally based but lacked substantial legal challenges to
the local state.
Under such pressure, especially that from the cyberspace, the local court finally had to hear Zhao’s
case. Instant messaging programs, microblogs and so on were used to quickly disseminate
information about the trials of Zhao.17 During the trials, activists from all over the country and many
local state workers went to the court site to voice their protests. The online organization of resistance
in the second phrase, which was less amenable to control and beyond the provincial boundary, made
the local authorities very difficult to deal with. The overwhelming influence of this case amplified
through the Internet made the local government act as if ‘it was facing a major enemy force’ during
the trials, according to an interviewee. Nonetheless, the suppression of Zhao has not stopped the
resistance, and it actually ‘provided a channel through which citizens defend or pursue their
legitimate rights in China’ (p. 24) (Cai, 2008).
In sum, the study shows that the basic structural conditions for the resistance were furnished by
technological development in communication and transformation in labour politics among state
workers. With the help of the Internet, a fledgling civil society of online communities and offline
rights organization among workers and the creativity of Internet users combined to sustain both
online and office activism in this case. We agree with what Economy and Mondschein (2011) argues
that ‘while the Internet may not have produced a revolution in China’s political system, it most
certainly is producing an evolution’, especially as it helped workers gain significant media influence
which was unavailable previously .

15

For example, an open letter was signed and posted online by 53 domestic and overseas academics, including some from leading
institutions (China Labor News Translations, 2010). In the cities of Luoyang and Zhengzhou in Henan province, Maoist activists
organised sympathy protests to support Zhao. Protests were even held at Chinese embassies overseas.
16
Some of the most influential and confrontational reports exposed the internal, confidential communication on how the Provincial
Trade Union secretly thwarted Zhao, illuminated detailed allegations of corruption among union officials, and defended Zhao’s actions
as manifestation of his commitment to the CCP (China Labor News Translations, 2011).
17
For example, information was regularly updated on Wuyouzhixiang (website: http://www.wyzxsx.com/) and then reposted to other
websites.
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Discussion and conclusion
Faced with substantial income inequality, rampant corruption and social ills, the masses in China
have for a long time been filled with anger and indignation. Protesters refer to rights clearly set out in
law, government policies as well as extracts from CCP leaders’ discourses for justification. Among the
(former) state workers, there is a growing scepticism about the current regime and a yearning for the
old Maoist era. They were not content with the status quo and refer to Maoist theory and ideology
about socialism, socio-economic rights and justice, and most importantly, the status of state workers,
in protesting against SOE management and malfunctioning trade unions.
Against this background, this paper has presented a case study of rightful resistance utilizing both
traditional and emerging means.
In the first phase of the resistance, although largely following the conventional pattern, the Study
Group and the Rights Congress represented a strategic turn in Maoist organizing in contemporary
China. Their allegations, requests and proposals all mixed Maoist rhetoric with contemporary legal
and constitutional arguments and showed absolute allegiance to the Party-state, although we found
that not all participants essentially believed in these principles. Actually these organizational designs
and rhetoric were more or less contrived to create difficult ties for the local authorities to have charges
of ‘state subversion’ or ‘collusion with foreign elements’ stick to the Study Group and the Rights
Congress. Therefore this was as a self-protective approach to legitimatize their actions. The
participants in general saw their actions legal, peaceable and concessional in front of corrupted
officials. However, the Provincial Trade Union, the target of the resistance, took a different view and
perceived these actions as disturbing and threatening. It magnified the severity of these actions to the
level that they directly challenged the authorities of the state.
The strategy and rhetoric standing were reused in the second phase but on a different platform. After
Zhao was detained, state workers from the original group and supporters in Shaanxi and other places
had consistently ventilated the matter beyond the provincial boundary through the Internet. They also
excogitated a plan to turn the case into a referendum on the nature of the CCP through a mixture of
online and real-life activities confrontational to the local state, which once hoped to trammel the
influence of the case within Shaanxi. The questions, facing the local state, changed from whether the
Rights Congress was legal to whether the CCP would defend one of its own, who was merely
attempting to uphold the legal rights of workers. If not, then wasn’t the CCP signaling that it no longer
represented the workers, or the putative protagonists of the CCP and nation?
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However, the suppressing approach taken by the local authorities — especially during Zhao’s wife’s
sickness and death — triggered more anger amongst workers and the online audience, and wiped out
any hope for an amicable settlement with the local authorities. Nonetheless, considering that a threeyear sentence was the minimum for this crime, the sentence was relatively light compared to other
harsh suppressive measures.18 Leftist groups and rights defenders therefore hailed Zhao’s suspended
sentence as a major victory of grassroots leftist resistance. However, by criminalising this type of
movement against the trade union, the local authorities could deter similar activities in the future by
referring to Zhao’s case. Thus, a new — as yet unclear — baseline regarding what will (or not) be
tolerated was established by the local state. This crushed the state workers’ hopes for establishing a
self-organised labour movement within the framework of rightful resistance that had previously been
less risky than wholly un-institutionalised defiance.
This phenomenon of rights resistance coalescing into the Maoism is especially evident in the inland
industrialised cities of China, whose economies and administrations have been unable to
accommodate disadvantaged state workers through compensations, strong job markets and welfare
systems. In these cities, Maoists often hold meetings, discussions and commemorative activities on
anniversary dates for Mao, the CCP and socialist China to protest against capitalism-driven
development. As demonstrated earlier, online media were widely used in recent years to promote,
organise and spread resistance. The Chinese Government now keeps a close eye on the Maoists and
their political activities, especially those that are relatively organised and radical. In order to preserve
the one-party dictatorship of the bureaucratic regime, the CCP has continued to brutally suppress
many kinds of social or mass movement that could potentially challenge it. An increasingly harsh and
secretive court procedure is imposed on social activists, including rightist liberals, leftist Maoists and
trade unionists. Since the arrest of Zhao and the crushing of a more radical group of activists called
the Maoist Communist Party of China, there have been further conflicts and clashes between Maoist
masses and the police in places such as Shaanxi and Henan provinces where a larger number of SOEs
locate.
The state had once allowed a relatively loosened environment on Internet (Tai, 2006). But recently
the state has tightened its control over online leftist discussion and communication and attempts to
snuff out the radical voice of dissension. Bo Xilai, one of the high-profile leftist leadership contender
hoping to enter the Standing Committee of Politburo, was dismissed on 15 March 2012, one day after
Premier Wen Jiabo called for actions to avert the repeat of Maoist Cultural Revolution. After that
some leftist forums that supported Bo were warned, suspended or even closed down. Between 31
18

For example, in 2007 two laid-off workers involved in a lesser-known case in Xi’an were sentenced to three years for the same crime
enacted on a much smaller scale (they led a group of laid-off workers to block the entrance of a suburban SOE).
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March and 3 April 2012, two major Chinese microblogging sites were punished for allowing bloggers
to spread rumours about a military coup linked to Bo in Beijing and their comment functions were
suspended. All these actions explicitly signal to the Maoists and leftists that online organizing of
activities and dissemination of radical information that challenged the Party-state are unsupported
and becoming difficult now more than ever. Nonetheless not only leftists but also other discontents
have been closely monitored online (Davies, 2012).
At the local level, the rapidly developed online media in China have thrust many local conflicts and
low and middle-tier officials into the limelight, which would not have been possible before. In many
cases , the revelation of illegal activities has resulted in disciplinary action, dismissal from post, and
even formal investigation over potential corruption. For example, in September 2012 the former head
of Shaanxi province's Bureau of Work Safety photographed grinning at the scene of a fatal coach crash
has been removed from his post, due to ‘serious violation of discipline’ after Internet vigilantes found
that he was in possession of a number of expensive watches. Therefore it is understandable that why
local officials usually have ‘media horror’ and try to confine its influence in local conflicts.
Goldkorn (p. 169) (2012) believes that the year 2011 was a watershed because ‘the Chinese
Government officials began reading Internet postings with a care once reserved for picking through
editorials in the People’s Daily. The ability to decipher gnomic utterances in the Party newspaper was
once vital to a political career; today, understanding the Internet is arguably even more important for
Party and non-Party observers alike for the way it reflects China’s restive reality.’ But the trend
becomes indistinct in 2012, and beyond it is hard to predict, since the top Chinese politicians
themselves were recently affected by these information flows. Right before the once-in-a-decade
power shift in November 2012, a devastating investigative report on the Premier Wen Jiabo’s hidden
family wealth was published by the New York Times and widely circulated online before it was banned
in mainland China by the most extensive and sophisticated system for Internet censorship (Barboza,
2012; Bradsher, 2012). It seems that the system will continue to provide some limited space for
censored discussion on certain topics. However, the high pressure approach to Internet regulation
will not change in a foreseeable period of time given that there will be no change to CCP’s hardline
policies. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the Chinese state is not ‘the high-capacity juggernaut
familiar from the headlines’, but ‘a hodgepodge of disparate actors ambivalent about what types of
activism it can live with’ (p. 190) (Stern and O'Brien, 2011).
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The decline of the Rights Congress – still in operation in Shaanxi nowadays – has not ended. The
resistance has continued despite the state’s negative response.19 After release, Zhao continues his
resistance efforts through writings, and most of these are published on his personal blog in the name
of the Study Group, addressing the authorities in a softened manner.20 Meanwhile, a differentiation
among the members of the Study Group and supporters has emerged, and some of them no longer
agree with Zhao. For example, an interviewed major liaison that was responsible for managing the
donation to Zhao during his detention questioned his sincerity in helping workers and criticized him
for his self-promotion as the most important leader of the resistance.
The conflict between online disorder in the second phrase and local state’s pursuit of both online and
real world order in this case imply that, although it is tightly controlled and risky sometimes, the
cyberspace has proved to be a usable platform for democratic and civic participation in a more and
more open society (Benney, 2011). The state itself is currently in a difficult position as to how to
decide the extent of openness of cyberspace, during the construction of consultative authoritarianism
which essentially requires more understanding and involvement between the state and the people.
Therefore the conflicts in this and many other cases may create certain space for negotiation as the
local state has strong incentive to avoid such conflicts.
During the local state’s attempt to reconcile the contradiction and suppress the dissidence, state
workers’ labour action will surge again — probably in a different form — to find out what the new
bottom line is and what the new outlets can be. In the future, it will be interesting to examine the new
interplays between these parties. For example, how will the workers’ future resistance adaptive to the
increasingly constrained online and offline environments after the local state outlawed the Rights
Congress and disgraced Zhao? How will the local state’s new counter-actions influence the state
workers, Maoists and leftists? And a fundamental question is that how the Party-state copes with
more and more conflicts in the existing socio-political framework, especially after then General
Secretary of CCP Hu Jintao explicitly dismissed the possibility of either adopting Western-style
democracy or returning to the Maoist governance in his farewell speeches at the 18th Party Congress.

19

For example, in July 2010 workers at two largest post-reform textile mills in Xianyang coordinated simultaneous strikes for wage
increases and they succeeded.
20
Zhao’s speech about ‘revolution and amendment’ can be found on YouTube (see http://youtu.be/L5-edu7L1l0).
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Figure 1: Actions and responses in the first and second phases of resistance
The first phase

The second phase
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